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Joint Attention and Understanding Others*
Abstract
In this paper I criticize theory-biased and overly individualist approaches to understanding 
others and introduce the PAIR account of joint attention as a pragmatic, affectively charged 
intentional relation. I argue that this relation obtains in virtue of intentional contents in the 
minds of the co-attenders, and – against the received understanding of intentional states as 
propositional attitudes – that we should recognize what I call ‘subject mode’ and ‘position 
mode’ intentional content. Based on findings from developmental psychology, I propose 
that this subject mode content represents the co-attenders as co-subjects, who are like them 
and who are at least disposed to act jointly with them. I conclude by arguing that in joint 
attention we experience and understand affective, actional and perceptual relations at a 
non-conceptual level prior to the differentiation of mind and body.
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it	 from	a	detached,	 theoretical	point	of	view.	 In	 fairness	 to	 this	 tradition	 it	
should	be	noted	 though	 that	at	 least	Davidson	 in	his	 later	work	 (Davidson	
2001)	moves	more	towards	a	view	which	emphasizes	such	points	as	that	in	
order	to	share	a	language	with	people	one	also	needs	to	share	many	beliefs	

















































velopmental	psychology.	 I	will	 then	sketch	a	 framework	 for	understanding	
the	intentional	structure	of	joint	attention	that	introduces	the	concept	of	mode	






velopmental	 psychology	 and	 introduce	 the	PAIR-account	 of	 joint	 attention	
as	 a	pragmatic	 and	 affective	 intentional	 relation.	 I	will	 then	 argue	 that	 the	
mode	account	can	explain	an	additional	result	from	that	literature,	namely	that	







2. Joint attention, content, and mode
The	most	 fundamental	 fact	about	 jointly	attending	 to	something	 is	 that	 the	
jointness	is	not	a	matter	of	what we attend to,	but	of	attending	with somebody	
(Campbell	2002,	chap.	8).	The	main	goal	of	 this	paper	 is	 to	argue	 that	 the	
best	way	 to	understand	 this	 fact	 is	 through	 the	notion	of	mode	 representa-
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tions,	 through	which	 the	co-attenders	experience	 themselves	as	co-subjects	
of	a	shared	position	with	regard	to	the	object	of	their	attention.	By	contrast,	
and	 in	 accordance	with	 the	 biases	 noted	 above,	 some	have	 tried	 to	 under-
stand	joint	attention	and	similar	phenomena	like	common	knowledge	purely	
in	 terms	of	what	 individual	subjects	attend	 to	or	what	 they	know.	But	 it	 is	
hard	to	see	how	from	such	a	perspective	joint	awareness	can	be	distinguished	
from	mere	mutual	awareness,	from	which	it	seems	clearly	different	–	though	























































most	writers	on	the	 topic,	I	will	 restrict	 the	notion	to	 the	more	elementary,	
non-conceptual,	sensory-motor-emotional	forms	of	attending	jointly.
I	agree	with	the	Relational	View	of	joint	attention	(Campbell	2002;	Seemann	
2011)	 insofar	 as	 it	 emphasizes	 its	 triangular	 nature;	 the	 distinctive	way	 in	
which	 the	co-attender	figures	 in	 that	 relation;	and	its	experiential	character	
–	the	latter	against	views	such	as	Peacocke’s	who	see	it	as	conceptual	level	




jointly	attending	 to	z?	Relations	 indeed	make	statements	of	 this	 form	 true,	
but	these	relations	only	exist	because	of	the	contents	of	individual	minds,	and	





























Disjunctivism	 is	 chiefly	 motivated	 through	 epistemological	 concerns.	 The	
disjunctivist	is	worried	that	if	we	allow	that	there	are	intentionally	content-












































have	 the	 corresponding	 capacity.	As	 I	 have	 emphasized,	 on	 the	 traditional	
view	even	this	practical	attitude	in	some	sense	contains	something	from	the	
theoretical	domain.	However,	on	reflection	 it	 is	hard	 to	make	sense	of	 this	
idea.	It	is	not	that	the	general	predicts	that	it	will	rain	on	the	basis	of	evidence	









theoretical	or	practical	position	of	 the	 subject	vis-à-vis	 the	 state	of	 affairs.	
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(The	mistake	of	(2)	of	the	received	view	is	to	assume	that	the	element	com-





















For	 a	 subject	 cannot	 represent	 its	 relation	 to	 some	 state	 of	 affairs	without	
representing	itself.	For	example,	I	cannot	represent	my	passive	position	vis-
à-vis	the	objects	of	my	perceptual	states	without	representing	myself.	I	ex-
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sents	 their	object,	which	 is	 (at	 least	 typically)	a	state	of	affairs,	and	which	 I	
call	‘state	of	affairs’	content	or	‘what’	content	because	it	is	what	is	believed	or	
intended;	(2)	another	part	is	associated	with	the	type	of	attitude	of	the	subject,	




3. Joint attention as pragmatic, affective and relational: 












of	 inspiration	 for	 the	 idea	 that	we	 experience	 others	 as	 co-subjects.	One	 I	





































































perience	each	other,	but	also	 in	how	 they	see	 the	world	 ‘with	each	other’s	
eyes’.	So	those	who	are	bound	together	in	a	 joint	attention	episode	tend	to	

































common ground established by joint attention,	but	that	they	could	not	under-
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attunement	 to,	 and	 affirmation	of	 one’s	 co-attenders.	The	 ‘I’	 indicates	 that	
this	 relation	 is	 intentional	and	 involves	 identification	with	and	 imitation	of	




















the	action	of	a	character	who	has	 false	beliefs,	 at	 around	3	1/2	 to	4	years.	
They	are	even	more	pressing	if	we	subscribe	to	the	traditional,	theory-biased	
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perspective	 of	 the	 theorist	 and	 that	 of	 the	 subject	 of	 basic	 experience	 that	
we	are	 trying	 to	understand.	There	may	be	 some	similarities	between	how	
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tions	–	to	use	Butterfill	and	Apperly’s	(2012)	apt	term	–	and	can,	for	example,	
on	 this	 basis	understand	people’s	 requests	 and	what	 they	might	be	 excited	












that	newer	versions	of	 the	 traditional	 tasks	 really	 test	 for	 the	same	kind	of	
capacities,	just	for	important	precursors	of	them.	That	a	child,	as	evidenced	
by	increased	looking	times,	is	surprised	when	a	subject	does	not	look	for	an	
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understanding	others.	And	I	have	made	a	case	that	we	best	account	for	 the	
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U ovome radu kritiziram pretjerano individualističke i teorijski pristrane pristupe razumijeva-
nju drugih te uvodim PAIR shvaćanje zajedničke pažnje kao pragmatične, afektivno nabijene 
intencionalne relacije. Tvrdim da ova relacija postoji kao intencionalni sadržaj u umovima 
sudionika u pažnji te da bismo trebali – nasuprot uvriježenom razumijevanju intencionalnih 
stanja kao propozicijskih stavova – priznati ono što nazivam ‘subjektni modus’ i ‘pozicijski 
modus’ intencionalnog sadržaja. Na temelju rezultata istraživanja razvojne psihologije, pred-
lažem da ovaj subjektni modus sadržaja predstavlja sudionike u pažnji kao ko-subjekte, koji im 
nalikuju i koji su u najmanju ruku u mogućnosti djelovati zajedno s njima. Zaključujem tvrdeći 
da u zajedničkoj pažnji iskušavamo i shvaćamo afektivne, djelatne i percepcijske relacije na 




Gemeinsame Aufmerksamkeit und das Verstehen anderer
Zusammenfassung
In diesem Artikel kritisiere ich theorielastige und übertrieben individualistische Ansätze zum Ver-
stehen Anderer und führe die PAIR-Auffassung gemeinsamer Aufmerksamkeit als einer pragma-
tischen, affektiv geladenen intentionalen Relation ein. Ich vertrete die Ansicht, dass diese Relati-
on aufgrund der intentionalen Inhalte im Bewusstsein ihrer Subjekte existiert, und dass wir – im 
Gegensatz zur traditionellen Auffassung intentionaler  Zustände als propositionale Einstellungen 
– anerkennen sollten, dass auch das, was ich als „Subjektmodus“ und „Positionsmodus“ be-
zeichne, intentionalen Gehalt hat. Basierend auf Forschungsergebnissen aus der Entwicklungs-
psychologie schlage ich vor, dass der Inhalt des Subjektmodus die Aufmerksamkeit-Teilnehmer 
als Mitsubjekte repräsentiert, die ihnen gleichen und zumindest geneigt sind, gemeinsam mit 
ihnen zu handeln. Ich schließe mit der Behauptung, dass wir in der gemeinsamen Aufmerksamkeit 
affektive, aktionale und perzeptuelle Beziehungen auf einer nicht-begrifflichen Ebene erfahren 





L’attention conjointe et la compréhension des autres
Résumé
Dans cet article, je critique les approches de la compréhension des autres excessivement théo-
riques et individualistes, puis j’introduis l’explication PAIR de l’attention conjointe comme une 
relation intentionnelle pragmatique, chargée affectivement. J’affirme que cette relation a cours 
comme contenu intentionnel dans l’esprit des co-participants et que – à l’encontre de la compré-
hension habituelle des états intentionnels en tant qu’attitudes propositionnelles – nous devrions 
reconnaître ce que j’appelle contenu intentionnel en « mode sujet » et en « mode position ». Me 
fondant sur les résultats de la recherche en psychologie du développement, je propose que ce 
contenu en mode sujet représente les co-participants en tant que co-sujets, qui leur ressemblent 
et qui sont les moins disposés à agir conjointement avec eux. Je conclus en affirmant que dans 
l’attention conjointe nous vivons et comprenons les relations affectives, actives et perceptuelles 
à un niveau non-conceptuel préalable à la différenciation de l’esprit et du corps.
Mots-clés
attention	conjointe,	intentionnalité	collective,	autres	esprits,	intentionalisme,	dualisme	esprit-corps
